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Résumé / Abstract
Nous analysons les mécanismes optimaux d’échange dans un
contexte où chaque participant possède quelques unités d’un bien à être échangé
et pourrait être soit un acheteur, soit un vendeur, dépendant de la réalisation des
valorisations qui sont de l’information privée des participants. D’abord, le
concept de valeur virtuelle est généralisé aux agents qui ne sont pas ex ante
identifiés comme acheteur ou vendeur; contrairement au cas où les agents sont
bien identifiés, les valeurs virtuelles des agents dépendent maintenant du
mécanisme d’échange et ne sont généralement pas monotones même si la
distribution des valorisations est régulière. Nous montrons que les mécanismes
optimaux d’échange, qui maximisent l’espérance de profit ou de gains d’échange
d’un intermédiaire, sont complètement caractérisés par ces valeurs virtuelles. Le
phénomène de discrimination incomplète (bunching), qui est ici spécifique aux
agents non identifiés ex ante, va être une caractéristique générale dans les
mécanismes optimaux. Nous montrons aussi que la règle de répartition aléatoire
par laquelle les égalités sont brisées est maintenant un instrument important dans
le design de ces mécanismes.
We analyze optimal trading mechanisms in environments where each
trader owns some units of a good to be traded and may be either a seller or a
buyer, depending on the realization of privately observed valuations. First, the
concept of virtual valuation is extended to ex ante unidentified traders; contrary
to the case with identified traders, the traders’ virtual valuations now depend
on the trading mechanism and are generally not monotonic even if the
distribution of valuations is regular. We show that the trading mechanisms that
maximize a broker’s expected profit or expected total gains from trade are
completely characterized by some modified monotonic virtual valuations. Here,
the bunching phenomena, which is specific to ex ante unidentified traders, will
be a general feature in these mechanisms. We also show that the randomization
rule by which ties are broken is now an important instrument in the design of
the optimal mechanisms.
Mots Clés : Design de mécanisme, échange efficace, intermédiation,
discrimination incomplète, information asymétrique
Keywords : Mechanism design, efficient trading, intermediation, bunching,
asymmetric information
JEL : D44, D82
1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider the trading problem for a market composed
of traders who own some units of an indivisible good and have private
information about their own valuations. In this context, a trader holding
some units of the good (but less than his satiated demand level) may be
either a seller or a buyer, depending on the realization of the privately
observed information; however, his role in exchange cannot be identied
prior to trade. The standard double auction is then a special case of our
model in which all traders possess one or zero units of the good and have
unit-demand, so each trader is well identied as a seller or a buyer prior
to trade.
We characterize the prot-maximizing trading mechanism and the
ex ante ecient trading mechanism by solving the general optimal trad-
ing mechanism that maximizes a weighted sum of the expected total
gains from trade and the expected prot for the mechanism designer.
First, the concept of virtual valuation (Myerson 1981 and 1984) will be
extended to ex ante unidentied traders; contrary to the case with identi-
ed traders, the traders' virtual valuations now depend on the allocation
rules. Additionally, the monotonicity of a trader's virtual valuation fails
in any incentive-compatible trading mechanism even if the distribution
of valuations is regular. We show that the optimal trading mechanisms
are completely characterized by some modied monotonic virtual valu-
ations: the goods will be assigned to the traders whose modied virtual
valuations are highest and ties will be broken by randomizing. Also, the
participation constraint may be binding at points other than the highest
and/or lowest types, and the bunching phenomenon will be a general
feature and is specically associated with ex ante unidentied traders
in these optimal mechanisms. In constructing optimal trading mecha-
nisms, we show that the randomization rule by which ties are broken is
an important instrument in the design of these mechanisms. As an illus-
tration, using the technique developed in this paper, we solve explicitly
the optimal mechanisms for three-trader cases.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we rst
dene the formal structure of the multilateral trading problem. We
then present a general characterization of all incentive compatible and
individually rational mechanisms. In section 3, we show how to construct
a prot-maximizing mechanism through an algorithm. In section 4, we
extend the result of section 3 to a general class of maximization problems
and show that the ex ante ecient mechanism is a special case of this
class. In section 5, we solve explicitly for the optimal mechanism for the
three-trader example.
1
2 A Trading Problem with Ex Ante Uniden-
tied Traders
We consider the trading problem for a market composed of n traders
indexed by i 2 N = f1; 2;    ; ng. Each trader i owns k
i
units of an indi-
visible good to be traded and has private information about a preference
parameter v
i
which is drawn independently from the same distribution
F with support [v; v] and positive continuous density f . Other traders
do not observe a trader's type v but know that it is drawn from F .
Throughout, we shall assume that the traders want to hold at most k
0
units of the good and are risk neutral. Since the traders have k
0
-unit
demand, we assume that k
i
 k
0
for all i 2 N ; that is, no trader is
initially endowed with more than what he wants to hold.
A trader of type v has preferences represented by the utility function
u
i
(q; t; v) = vmin(q; k
0
  k
i
)  t
where q   k
i
is the number of units acquired by the trader and t is total
spending on these units. The utility is normalized in order to measure
the benet from net trade and we have u
i
(0; 0; v) = 0 for all v. Note
that v is the trader's reservation price for each unit of the k
0
rst units
of the good.
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In this context, ex post eciency requires that all units
of good are assigned to the traders with the highest valuations. Denote
the total number of units by K =
P
n
i=1
k
i
and let K = n
0
k
0
+ r with
n
0
; r positive integers and 0  r < k
0
. Formally, the ex post ecient
allocation can be dened as
2
q
i
(v
i
; v
 i
) =
8
<
:
k
0
  k
i
; if v
i
is among the n
0
highest values
r   k
i
; if v
i
is the (n
0
+ 1)
th
highest value
 k
i
; otherwise
(1)
We consider the direct revelation mechanisms in which traders simul-
1
An alternative assumption is that each trader has a vector of valuations v
i
=
(v
1
i
; v
2
i
;    ; v
k
0
i
), where v
j
i
represents the trader's valuation of his j
th
unit of the
good. If these valuations are not perfectly correlated, it involves a problem of mul-
tidimensional uncertainty which appears to be much more complicated. (see Rochet
1985, and Laont, Maskin, and Rochet 1987) For simplicity, we restrict ourselves to
the one-dimensional case.
2
Notice that since ties occcur with zero probability, they will not aect the ex-
pected quantities and so will be ignored in what follows. In general, the private
information about valuations and asymmetric initial endowments may lead to some
ineciency in trade; that is, a procedure that can implement the ex post ecient
allocation while satisfying individual rationality and budget balance may not always
exist. (see Cramton et al. 1987, and Lu 1996)
2
taneously report their valuations
3
v = (v
1
; v
2
;    ; v
n
) and then receive
an allocation q(v) = (q
1
(v);    ; q
n
(v)) and t(v) = (t
1
(v);    ; t
n
(v)),
where q
i
is the net trade for trader i and t
i
is the net money trans-
fer from trader i. We assume that each trader is endowed with enough
money that any required transfer is feasible. Also, we require that these
allocations balance:
P
n
i=1
q
i
(v) = 0 for all v 2 [v; v]
n
. Since all traders
want to hold at most k
0
units, we can assume that  k
i
 q
i
 k
0
  k
i
for all i 2 N . The pair of outcome functions fq; tg is referred to as a
direct trading mechanism.
Denote  i = Nnfig and let E
 i
[  ] be the expectation operator with
respect to v
 i
. Then we can dene the expected net trade and payment
for trader i when he announces v
i
as his type
Q
i
(v
i
) = E
 i
[q
i
(v
i
; v
 i
)]
and
T
i
(v
i
) = E
 i
[t
i
(v
i
; v
 i
)]
so the trader's expected payo, when everyone truthfully reports, is given
by
U
i
(v
i
) = E
 i
[u
i
(q
i
(v
i
; v
 i
); t
i
(v
i
; v
 i
); v
i
)] = v
i
Q
i
(v
i
)  T
i
(v
i
)
The trading mechanism fq; tg is incentive compatible if each type
of each trader wants to report his private information truthfully when
others report truthfully
U
i
(v
i
)  v
i
Q
i
(v^
i
)  T
i
(v^
i
); 8i 2 N 8v
i
; v^
i
2 [v; v] (2)
As is well known from the Revelation Principle, any Bayesian equilib-
rium outcome of any conceivable mechanism can be obtained as the
equilibrium outcome of a direct incentive compatible mechanism. Thus,
when we look for trading mechanisms, there is no loss of generality in
restricting our attention to direct incentive compatible mechanisms. The
mechanism fq; tg is interim individually rational if all types of all traders
are better o participating in the mechanism (in terms of their expected
payo) than holding their initial endowments
U
i
(v
i
)  0; 8i 2 N; 8v
i
2 [v; v] (3)
The mechanism fq; tg is feasible if it is incentive compatible and individ-
ually rational. The following lemma develops a necessary and sucient
condition for a mechanism to be feasible.
3
We assume that the initial endowments (k
1
; k
2
; : : : ; k
n
) are common knowledge,
but it is not essential. If the total number of units of the good K is known, we can ask
the traders to report their number of units and then forbid trade if the total number
reported does not equal K, and implement the mechanism if the reports agree with
K.
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Lemma 1. A trading mechanism fq; tg is feasible if and only if for every
i 2 N , Q
i
(v
i
) is non-decreasing and
U
i
(v
i
) = U
i
(v

i
) +
Z
v
i
v

i
Q
i
(u) du; 8v
i
2 [v; v] (4)
U
i
(v

i
)  0; 8i 2 N (5)
where
v

i
2 V

i
(q
i
) = fv
i
jQ
i
(u)  0;8u < v
i
;Q
i
(w)  0;8w > v
i
g (6)
Proof: See Appendix
Given a feasible mechanism fq; tg, since Q
i
(v
i
) is non-decreasing,
V

i
(q
i
) is well-dened and equation (4) implies that expected net utility
U
i
(v
i
) is continuous and convex in v
i
. Also, from (6), U
i
(v
i
) is minimized
at v

i
2 V

i
(q
i
) , which will be called the worst-o type of the trader.
Hence, (5) is equivalent to the individual rationality (3). If V

i
(q
i
) is
not a singleton, it is easy to check that V

i
(q
i
) is a closed interval and
all worst-o types in V

i
(q
i
) satisfy Q
i
(v

i
) = 0. That is, the worst-o
types expect to have net trade zero or receive a quantity equal to their
initial endowment. Intuitively, a worst-o type expects on average to be
neither a buyer nor a seller of the good, and therefore he has no incentive
to overstate or understate his valuation. Hence, he does not need to be
compensated in order to induce him to report his valuation truthfully,
which is why he is the worst-o type of trader. In general, it is no longer
clear who is selling and who is buying prior to revelation of types; but
on average, trader i is a buyer if his type v
i
> maxV

i
(q
i
) and a seller if
his type v
i
< minV

i
(q
i
).
Let us dene, for all v 2 [v; v]
(v) = v  
1  F (v)
f(v)
and (v) = v +
F (v)
f(v)
() and () are referred to as the virtual valuation of \buyer-type" and
\seller-type" respectively. For any v

i
2 [v; v], let
(v
i
jv

i
) =

(v
i
); v
i
< v

i
(v
i
); v
i
> v

i
(7)
(v
i
jv

i
) is referred to as the v

i
-virtual valuation.
4
Given a feasible
trading mechanism fq; tg, if v

i
is a worst-o type of trader i, (v
i
jv

i
)
4
There is no importance of the value of (v
i
jv

i
) at v

i
since the probability of
v
i
= v

i
is zero.
4
will be called the trader's virtual valuation of this mechanism. Now,
the trader's virtual valuation (v
i
jv

i
) is of \buyer-type" (\seller-type")
if and only if his worst-o type is v

i
= v (v

i
= v). Typically, a trader
may have virtual valuations of both \buyer-type" and \seller-type". For
example, when his valuation is greater than v

i
, he is considered as a
buyer since he will receive on average more than his initial endowment;
when v
i
< v

i
, his virtual valuation is calculated as a seller's since he will
receive on average less than his initial endowment. Moreover, (v) >
(v), the trader's virtual valuation is discontinuous at v

i
, where the
trader is expected to change his behavior. Lemma 1 leads to the following
characterization of expected revenue from trade of the mechanism.
Lemma 2. For any function q = (q
1
;    ; q
n
) such that Q
i
(v
i
) is non-
decreasing in v
i
for all i 2 N , there exists a payment function t such that
fq; tg is incentive compatible and individually rational. The maximum
expected revenue from any feasible trading mechanism implementing q
is given by
5
R(q) =
n
X
i=1
E[(v
i
jv

i
)q
i
(v)] =
n
X
i=1
E[(v
i
jv

i
)Q
i
(v
i
)] (8)
where v

i
2 V

i
(q
i
) is a worst-o type of trader i for which the individual
rationality is binding, i.e., U
i
(v

i
) = 0.
Proof : See Appendix
Note that when V

i
(q
i
) is an interval, since the expected net trade
Q
i
(v
i
) is zero on this interval, the expected revenue (8) does not depend
on the choice of v

i
2 V

i
(q
i
). A direct implication of Lemma 2 is revenue
equivalence: the expected revenue from a feasible trading mechanism is
completely determined by the allocation functions q = (q
1
;    ; q
n
) and
the utility levels of the worst-o type U
i
(v

i
) for all i 2 N . A feasible
trading mechanism can be extremely complicated, Lemma 2 helps sim-
plify, however, the problem of mechanism design by establishing that
if q is such that Q
i
() is non-decreasing for all i, then there exists cor-
responding payment function t() such that fq(v); t(v)g is an incentive
compatible mechanism in which truth-telling is an equilibrium. Thus,
the design of incentive compatible and individually rational mechanisms
boil down to nding suitable allocation functions q().
5
As a corollary, there exists a trading mechanism that can implement the ex post
ecient allocation (1) while satisfying individual rationality and budget balance if
and only if the ex post ecient allocation satises
P
n
i=1
E[(v
i
jv

i
)q
i
(v)]  0.
5
3 Prot-maximizing Mechanism
We rst consider the case where the traders are intermediated by a broker
who can be a net source or sink of money, but cannot himself own the
objects. In markets in which exchange requires costly search for trading
partners, an intermediary can help to reduce the trading frictions. An
interesting question is to ask for the mechanism which maximizes the
expected prot to the broker, subject to incentive compatibility and
individual rationality for traders. That is, if the traders can only trade
through the broker, then what is the optimal mechanism for the broker
? From Lemmas 1 and 2, the problem can be written as
P
m
8
<
:
max R(q) =
P
n
i=1
E[(v
i
jv

i
)q
i
(v)]
s.t.  k
i
 q
i
 k
0
  k
i
for all i and
P
n
i=1
q
i
= 0
Q
i
(v
i
) is non-decreasing in v
i
and v

i
2 V

i
(q
i
)
In P
m
, the virtual valuations (v
i
jv

i
) now depend on the traders'
worst-o types, so generally they will depend on the quantity schedules
q. Thus, the main diculty of the problem is that we must consistently
determine the traders' worst-o types at which the individual rationality
is binding as well as the allocation rules and, at the same time, maxi-
mize the expected prot to the broker. Fortunately, we can show that
the solution to P
m
can be characterized by some non-decreasing function
modied from (v
i
jv

i
) with some appropriate value v

i
. Here, the bunch-
ing phenomena will be a general feature in the optimal mechanism even
if the distribution of valuations is regular. To simplify matters, we will
assume that () and () are continuous and strictly increasing on [v; v]
(the monotone hazard rate assumption) and concentrate our attention
on the more interesting type of bunching that is specic to intermediate
traders.
6
We can now state and prove the main result of this paper.
Theorem 1. (i) There exists a unique x

= (x

1
;    ; x

n
) 2 [v; v]
n
for
which there will exist at least one allocation q

= (q

1
;    ; q

n
) which
satises
(A) q

(v) solves

max
P
n
i=1
E[
i
(v
i
jx

i
)q
i
(v)]
s.t.  k
i
 q
i
 k
0
  k
i
for all i and
P
n
i=1
q
i
= 0
where

i
(v
i
jx

i
) =

(v
i
jx

i
); if v
i
=2 [x

i
; y

i
]
(x

i
); if v
i
2 [x

i
; y

i
]
6
See, e.g., Myerson (1981), for details in the case where the distribution of valua-
tions is not regular.
6
with y

i
such that (y

i
) = (x

i
) or y

i
= v whenever (v)  (x

i
); and
(B) 8i, Q

i
(v
i
) = E
 i
[q

i
(v
i
; v
 i
)] = 0 for v
i
2 [x

i
; y

i
].
(ii) An allocation q

= (q

1
;    ; q

n
) is a solution to P
m
if and only if
it satises (A) and (B) for this vector x

.
Proof: (i) We rst show that there exists a pair x

and q

which
satisfy (A) and (B). To prove existence we proceed by submitting an
algorithm to construct the solution.
Given some vector x

, the allocation q

(v) solves (A) if and only if
q

i
(v
i
; v
 i
jx

) =
8
<
:
k
0
  k
i
; if 
i
(v
i
jx

i
) > l(vjx

)
randomizing; if 
i
(v
i
jx

i
) = l(vjx

)
 k
i
; otherwise
(9)
where l(vjx

) for any v is such that the number, M
1
, of traders with
parameter values v
i
for which 
i
(v
i
jx

i
)  l(vjx

) is at least n
0
+ 1,
and the number, M
2
, for which 
i
(v
i
jx

i
) > l(vjx

) is at most n
0
. The
randomization rule by which ties are broken is here irrelevant. We can
reindex participants so that k
1
 k
2
     k
n
. Since 
i
(ujx

i
) 

j
(ujx

j
) for all u when x

i
> x

j
, from (9), we are clearly looking for a
vector x

such that x

1
 x

2
     x

n
.
For now, consider the solution to (A) ~q(vjx

) (given some x

) where
ties are always broken in favor of those with the highest index. Let
e
Q
i
(x

i
) = E
 i
[~q(x

i
; v
 i
jx

)] be the expected net trade for the participant
indexed i when v
i
= x

i
under this alloaction rule.
e
Q
i
(x

i
) is well-dened
and continuous and strictly increasing.
7
Lemma 3. For a given vector x

, there will exist a q

satisfying Con-
ditions (A) and (B), if and only if we have:
e
Q
i
(x

i
) = 0 whenever
7
Since x

1
 x

2
     x

n
, we have
e
Q
i
(x

i
) = (k
0
  k
i
)Probfthere are less than n
0
other traders who have either
valuation greater than y

i
and index lower than i or
valuation greater than x

i
and index higher than ig
+ (r   k
i
)Probfthere are exactly n
0
other traders who have either
valuation greater than y

i
and index lower than i or
valuation greater than x

i
and index higher than ig
  k
i
Probfthere are at least n
0
+ 1 other traders who have either
valuation greater than y

i
and index lower than i or
valuation greater than x

i
and index higher than ig
where y

i
is dened as in (A) of Theorem 1. Obviously y

i
is continuous and non-
decreasing in x

i
, hence
e
Q
i
(x

i
) is continuous and strictly increasing.
7
x
i 1
< x

i
< x

i+1
; and whenever x

i 1
< x

i
= x

i+1
=    = x

j
< x

j+1
we have: 8i  j,
P
m
l=i
e
Q
l
(x

l
)  0 for all m < j and
P
j
l=i
e
Q
l
(x

l
) = 0.
Proof: (a) Necessity: Note that the 
i
's increase up to some x

i
, then
is constant between x

i
and y

i
and increases afterward. A positive proba-
bility of a tie between two traders i and j is possible if and only if x

i
= x

j
.
If so, 
i
(vjx

i
) = 
j
(vjx

j
) = (x

i
) for a positive mass of values v. Hence,
when x

i 1
< x

i
< x

i+1
, the probability of a tie between i and any other
participant when v
i
= x

i
is zero. So for all solutions q

to (A), we must
have Q

i
(x
i
) =
e
Q
i
(x

i
). Ties will occur only if for a subset of participants,
S = fi; i+ 1;    ; jg, we have x

i 1
< x

i
= x

i+1
=    = x

j
< x

j+1
. In
such a case, we have
e
Q
i
(x

i
)  Q

i
(x

i
) for all admissible solutions q

to
(A) because i always loses ties against participants of higher indexes in
the solution leading to
e
Q
i
. Similarly,
P
m
l=i
e
Q
l
(x

l
) 
P
m
l=i
Q

l
(x

l
) for
all m < j. Further, since the expected net trade for a group of par-
ticipants is independent of how ties are randomly broken between them
and the probability of a tie between any two traders l 2 S and h =2 S
when v
l
= x

l
is zero, we must have
P
j
l=i
e
Q
l
(x

l
) =
P
j
l=i
Q

l
(x

l
) for all
solutions q

to (A).
From the above argument, there will be a q

satisfying (A) and (B)
for a given x

, only if for all i  j,
P
m
l=i
e
Q
l
(x

l
)  0 for all m < j and
P
j
l=i
e
Q
l
(x

l
) = 0 when x

i 1
< x

i
= x

i+1
=    = x

j
< x

j+1
.
(b) Suciency is more involved. If x

i 1
< x

i
< x

i+1
, then q

i
(vjx

i
) is
uniquely specied by the rule. But if we have x

i 1
< x

i
= x

i+1
=    =
x

j
< x

j+1
, we must specify a (random) tie breaking rule for participants
in the subset S = fi; : : : ; jg. We need to increase the probability that
the low index participants are awarded units in case of a tie to garantee
that the expected net trades are equal for all participants in S. One can
implement any randomization rule, by randomly assigning a hierarchy
rank to each participant in the subset S. Participants assigned to a
higher hierarchy rank win in case of a tie with participants of lower
index. The random assignment process is constructed in such a way
that participants in subset S have the same expected net trade, that is
0. For all m, we must have:
P
l2S

l
m
(
e
Q
l
(x

l
) + k
l
) = k
m
, where 
l
m
is
the probability that participant m is assigned rank l in the hierarchy. To
achieve this, one can construct a sequence of at most (j   i) one-by-one
random permutations from the initial index to a nal hierarchy. Details
are left to the reader.
8
2
8
Let m
1
be the lowest index such that net trade is strictly negative and m
2
be the
lowest index with strict positive net trade. We must have m
1
< m
2
, otherwise we
would have
P
m
2
l=i
e
Q
l
(x

l
) > 0. Then we assign some probability that participant m
1
8
In order to complete the proof of Theorem 1(i), we need to prove
the existence and uniqueness of the vector x

satisfying the condition of
Lemma 3. Existence can be established by construction. We rst look
for the (unique) vector ~x = (~x
1
; ~x
2
;    ; ~x
n
) such that
9
8
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
>
>
>
:
e
Q
1
(~x
1
) = 0
e
Q
1
(min(~x
1
; ~x
2
)) +
e
Q
2
(~x
2
) = 0
: : :
P
l
i=1
e
Q
i
(min(~x
i
;    ; ~x
l
)) = 0
: : :
P
n
i=1
e
Q
i
(min(~x
i
;    ; ~x
n
)) = 0
then we set x

i
= min(~x
i
;    ; ~x
n
). One can verify that the vector x

as
constructed above satises the conditions in Lemma 3.
Uniqueness follows from the strict monotonicity of
e
Q
i
's. Suppose
that x

and z

satisfy the system of equations in Lemma 3 and x

i
< z

i
for some i. Let i
1
 i  i
2
and i
3
 i  i
4
such that x

i
1
 1
< x

i
1
=    =
x

i
=    = x

i
2
< x

i
2
+1
and z

i
3
 1
< z

i
3
=    = z

i
=    = z

i
4
< z

i
4
+1
,
then we have
0 
i
2
X
l=i
3
e
Q
l
(x

l
) <
i
2
X
l=i
3
e
Q
l
(z

l
)  0
which is a contradiction.
(ii) Suciency: Assume that x

and q

satisfy (A) and (B), then we
can show that q

must be a solution to P
m
.
Since q

solves (A), then q

i
(v
i
; v
 i
) is obviously non-decreasing in v
i
,
and similarly for Q

i
(v
i
). For all feasible allocation q^ = (q^
1
;    ; q^
n
) we
have
n
X
i=1
E[
i
(v
i
jx

i
)Q

i
(v
i
)] 
n
X
i=1
E[
i
(v
i
jx

i
)
b
Q
i
(v
i
)] (10)
is given index m
2
and vice versa. The probability is chosen such that the expected
net trade of either m
1
or m
2
becomes zero. We then recalculate the new expected
net trade given this reassignment probability and proceed with the new m
1
and m
2
.
In each round, we bring the net expected trade of at least one participant to zero, so
after a nite number of rounds, the net expected trade of all in S will be zero.
9
We rst nd ~x
1
such that
e
Q
1
(~x
1
) = 0. Since
e
Q
1
(v) =  k
1
< 0 and
e
Q
1
(v) =
k
0
  k
1
> 0, strict monotonicity and continuity of
e
Q
1
() implies the existence of a
unique solution ~x
1
. Given ~x
1
, we next nd ~x
2
such that
e
Q
1
(min(~x
1
; ~x
2
))+
e
Q
2
(~x
2
) = 0.
Again, we have
e
Q
1
(v) +
e
Q
2
(v) < 0 and
e
Q
1
(~x
1
) +
e
Q
2
(v) > 0, hence there exists a
unique ~x
2
which solves the above problem. We then proceed recursively to nd all ~x
l
.
Note that for all l,
P
l
i=1
e
Q
i
() is continuous, strictly increasing and
P
l
i=1
e
Q
i
(v) < 0
and
e
Q
l
(v) > 0.
9
But note that for all v

i
2 [x

i
; y

i
], we have
n
X
i=1
E[
i
(v
i
jx

i
)Q

i
(v
i
)] =
n
X
i=1
E[(v
i
jv

i
)Q

i
(v
i
)] (11)
this follows immediately from the fact that by construction, we have

i
(v
i
jx

i
) = (v
i
jv

i
) for v
i
=2 [x

i
; y

i
] and Q

i
(v
i
) = 0 for v
i
2 [x

i
; y

i
].
If
b
Q
i
(v
i
) is non-decreasing, then V

i
(q^
i
) is well-dened. For any v^
i
2
V

i
(q^
i
), we have
n
X
i=1
E[
i
(v
i
jx

i
)
b
Q
i
(v
i
)] =
n
X
i=1
E[(v
i
jv^
i
)
b
Q
i
(v
i
)]
+
n
X
i=1
E[(
i
(v
i
jx

i
)  (v
i
jv^
i
))
b
Q
i
(v
i
)]

n
X
i=1
E[(v
i
jv^
i
)
b
Q
i
(v
i
)] (12)
the inequality follows from the facts that 
i
(v
i
jx

i
)   (v
i
jv^
i
)  0 and
b
Q
i
(v
i
)  0 when v
i
< v^
i
, and 
i
(v
i
jx

i
)   (v
i
jv^
i
)  0 and
b
Q
i
(v
i
)  0
when v
i
> v^
i
. Using (10) and (11), (12) implies
n
X
i=1
E[(v
i
jv

i
)Q

i
(v
i
)] 
n
X
i=1
E[(v
i
jv^
i
)
b
Q
i
(v
i
)] (13)
for all feasible q^ with non-decreasing
b
Q
i
's. Hence q

solves P
m
.
Necessity: Now suppose that some alternative solution q^ to P
m
exists.
Clearly, (10) cannot hold with strict inequality: if so, (13) will hold with
strictly inequality contradicting the assumption that q^ solves P
m
. q^ must
also solve the program in (A). Now suppose that q^ does not satisfy (B),
i.e., for at least one i there is an open set (u;w)  [x

i
; y

i
] such that
for all v
i
2 (u;w),
b
Q
i
(v
i
) 6= 0. If so, for some v^
i
2 V

i
(q^
i
), there will
exist a positive probability of values v
i
such that 
i
(v
i
jx

i
) > (v
i
jv^
i
) (or
< (v
i
jv^
i
)) and
b
Q
i
(v
i
) < 0 (or
b
Q
i
(v
i
) > 0). Hence
E[(
i
(v
i
jx

i
)  (v
i
jv^
i
))
b
Q
i
(v
i
)] > 0
The inequality in (12) is strict, so must be the inequality in (13), which
contradicts the assumption that q^ is a solution to P
m
. Therefore, q^ must
satisfy (B). 2
From Theorem 1, in the optimal allocation, the objects should always
be assigned to the traders with the highest modied virtual valuations
10
i
(v
i
jx

i
). But, since 
i
(v
i
jx

i
) is constant on [x

i
; y

i
], ties may occur
with positive probability and should be broken by randomizing. The
randomization rule by which ties are broken may now aect the traders'
expected quantities and hence becomes an important instrument in the
design of the optimal trading mechanism. Intuitively, the optimal allo-
cation is designed in such a way that higher types are expected to be
buyers and lower types are expected to be sellers, yielding the most gains
from trade. By construction, we have v < x

i
< v when 0 < k
i
< k
0
,
that is, the individual rationality constraint for an intermediate trader is
necessarily binding between the highest and lowest types. Also, we have
x

i
 x

j
when k
i
 k
j
, but we may also have x

i
= x

j
when k
i
< k
j
.
That is, two traders with dierent initial endowments may have the same
types at which the individual rationality is binding and they expect to
be neither a buyer nor a seller. In general, j does not always win ties
against i in the optimal allocation, so if x

j
is separated from x

i
(just
above x

i
), the chance of winning of x
j
will be increased by a positive
probability. This implies that x

i
and x

j
can be separated only if k
j
  k
i
is large enough.
Theorem 1 proves a characterization of the optimal trading mech-
anism. In the following theorem, we provide some basic comparative
results.
Theorem 2. The expected revenue from the optimal trading mecha-
nism is (i) non-decreasing when the initial endowments are more sym-
metric and (ii) strictly increasing with k
0
.
Proof: (i) Let q

be the optimal allocation with initial endowments
k
i
and k
j
. Now suppose that we reallocate the initial endowment so that
i receives k
a
i
= ak
i
+(1 a)k
j
and j has k
a
j
= (1 a)k
i
+ak
j
, 0 < a 
1
2
.
We rst claim that the allocation, where q
a
l
= q

l
for all l 6= i; j and
q
a
i
= aq

i
+(1 a)q

j
and q
a
j
= (1 a)q

i
+aq

j
, is feasible. Indeed, for any v,
P
n
i=1
q
a
i
(v) =
P
n
i=1
q

i
(v) = 0;  k
i
 q

i
 k
0
 k
i
and k
j
 q

j
 k
0
 k
j
imply  (ak
i
+ (1  a)k
j
)  aq

i
+ (1  a)q

j
 k
0
  ak
i
  (1  a)k
j
.
Second, we show that q
a
generates at least as much return as q

. We
have
E[(v
i
jv

i
)Q

i
(v
i
)] + E[(v
j
jv

j
)Q

j
(v
j
)]
 E[(a(v
i
jv
a
i
) + (1  a)(v
i
jv
a
j
))Q

i
(v
i
)] + E[((1  a)(v
j
jv
a
i
) + a(v
j
jv
a
j
))Q

j
(v
j
)]
= E[(v
i
jv
a
i
)(aQ

i
(v
i
) + (1  a)Q

j
(v
i
))] +E[(v
j
jv
a
j
)(aQ

j
(v
j
) + (1   a)Q

i
(v
j
))]
= E[(v
i
jv
a
i
)Q
a
i
(v
i
)] +E[(v
j
jv
a
j
)Q
a
j
(v
j
)]
The rst inequality follows from the fact that ((v
i
jv
a
i
) (v
i
jv

i
))Q

i
(v
i
) 
0 for all v
a
i
. (A similar result applies for j). Note that that the inequality
is strict if the range over which Q

i
(v
i
) = 0 and the range over which
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Q
j
(v
j
) = 0 do not coincide. In this case, there will exist values v
i
such
that a(v
i
jv
a
i
) + (1  a)(v
i
jv
a
j
) > (v
i
jv

i
) and Q

i
(v
i
) > 0.
(ii) To show that expected revenue must strictly increase in k
0
, notice
that the optimal allocation q

given some initial k
0
0
is feasible with a
higher k
00
0
> k
0
0
. Furthermore, q

is not optimal since q

cannot satisfy
condition (A) of Theorem 1. There must exist a q^ which generates higher
return. 2
Intuitively, when the initial endowments are more unevenly distributed
amongst the participants, then everyone with more (less) good would
more likely expect to be a seller (buyer) and want to overstate (under-
state) his valuation. Such behavior, which is the essence of bargaining,
may increase the \bribe" one must oer them to induce truthful revela-
tion of private information. Hence, there will be less expected revenue
from the trading mechanism. On the other hand, the optimal allocation
requires that all goods go to the traders with the highest valuations.
When the traders have a higher level of demand, then the number of
traders to whom the goods are assigned is smaller. Hence, less incen-
tives are required to induce truthful revelation of the smaller number of
traders with the highest valuations; additionally, the gains from trade are
higher. Thus, the expected revenue from the optimal trading mechanism
is increasing with k
0
.
4 Ex ante ecient mechanisms
We can also extend the result of section 3 by introducing a general
objective function that is a weighted sum of the expected total gains
from trade and the expected revenue for the mechanism designer, i.e.,
for any  2 [0; 1]
W

(q) = (1  )E
"
n
X
i=1
v
i
q
i
(v)
#
+ R(q)
We seek a mechanism that maximizes the above objective function sub-
ject to the incentive compatibility and individual rationality for traders.
Using some algebra, W

(q) can be rewritten as
W

(q) = E
"
n
X
i=1
(v
i
jv

i
; )q
i
(v)
#
where for any v

i
2 V

i
(q
i
) and  2 [0; 1],
(v
i
jv

i
; ) =
(
(v
i
; ) = v
i
+ 
F (v
i
) 1
f(v
i
)
; v
i
> v

i
(v
i
; ) = v
i
+ 
F (v
i
)
f(v
i
)
; v
i
< v

i
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From Lemmas 1 and 2, the maximization problem can be written as
P

8
<
:
max W

(q) = E[
P
n
i=1
(v
i
jv

i
; )q
i
(v)]
s.t.  k
i
 q
i
 k
0
  k
i
for all i and
P
n
i=1
q
i
= 0
Q
i
(v
i
) is non-decreasing in v
i
and v

i
2 V

i
(q
i
)
Notice that if (v
i
) and (v
i
) are strictly increasing, it is straightforward
to verify that for any , (v
i
; ) and (v
i
; ) are also strictly increasing
in v
i
, so the virtual valuation (v
i
jv

i
; ) is increasing over [v; v

i
) and
(v

i
; v], but there is a \buyer-seller" spread of virtual valuation at v

i
.
Also, the trader's virtual valuations are distorted downward (upward)
to be below (above) his true reservation values when he expects to be a
buyer (seller).
P

has exactly the same structure as P
m
, so to solve P

, as in Theo-
rem 1 we should rst modify the virtual valuations by dening a mono-
tonic function

i
(v
i
jx

i
; ) =

(v
i
jx

i
; ); if v
i
=2 [x

i
; y

i
]
(x

i
; ); if v
i
2 [x

i
; y

i
]
with y

i
such that (y

i
; ) = (x

i
; ) or y

i
= v whenever (v; ) 
(x

i
; ). Also, let
q

i
(v
i
; v
 i
jx

; ) =
8
<
:
k
0
  k
i
; if 
i
(v
i
jx

i
; ) > l(vjx

; )
randomizing; if 
i
(v
i
jx

i
; ) = l(vjx

; )
 k
i
; otherwise
(14)
where l(vjx

; ) is similar to l(vjx

) in denition (9). The following the-
orem characterizes the optimal mechanism for P

, and can be obtained
as a direct generalization of Theorem 1.
Theorem 3. (i) There exists a unique x

= (x

1
;    ; x

n
) 2 [v; v]
n
for
which there will exist at least one randomization rule such that the
allocation (14) satises Q

i
(v
i
jx

; ) = E
 i
[q

i
(v
i
; v
 i
jx

; )] = 0 for all
v
i
2 [x

i
; y

i
]. (ii) An allocation q

= (q

1
;    ; q

n
) is a solution to P

if
and only if it satises (14) and Q

i
(v
i
jx

; ) = 0 for all v
i
2 [x

i
; y

i
].
Theorem 3 can be useful to characterize the most ecient trading
mechanism subject to the constraint that traders are not subsidized. In
some economic environments, (e.g., double auctions,) ex post eciency
cannot be achieved by any individually rational mechanism, unless some
outsider is willing to provide a subsidy to the traders for participating
in the trading mechanism. Since there is no reason to subsidize a pri-
vate goods market, ex post eciency is unattainable. Therefore, it is
natural to seek a mechanism that maximizes expected total gains from
13
trade, subject to the incentive compatibility and individual rational-
ity constraints, as well as the market-maker's budget constraint. (This
maximization is equivalent to maximizing the sum of the traders' ex
ante expected utilities because each trader's utility function is separable
in money and his valuation.) That is, we are looking for the ex ante
ecient mechanism
10
which solves
P
s
8
<
:
max E[
P
n
i=1
v
i
q
i
(v) ]
s.t.  k
i
 q
i
 k
0
  k
i
and
P
n
i=1
q
i
= 0
fq; tg is feasible and E[
P
n
i=1
t
i
(v)]  0
This problem can be rewritten as
P
s
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
max E[
P
n
i=1
v
i
q
i
(v) ]
s.t.  k
i
 q
i
 k
0
  k
i
and
P
n
i=1
q
i
= 0
Q
i
(v
i
) is non-decreasing in v
i
and E[
P
n
i=1
(v
i
jv

i
)q
i
(v)]  0;
where v

i
2 V

i
(q
i
)
We can show that P
s
is a special case of P

for some . In fact, if
the ex post ecient allocation is a solution to problem P
s
, then it is also
a solution to P

for  = 0. Otherwise, we need to set  =

1+
where 
corresponds to the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the no-subsidy
constraint for the market-maker. Since the ex post ecient allocation is
not a solution to problem P
s
, any allocation that satises the no-subsidy
constraint with equality and solves P

must be a solution to P
s
. Thus,
any solution q to P

for some  such that
E
"
n
X
i=1
(v
i
jv

i
)q
i
(v)
#
= 0 (15)
must be a solution to P
s
.
5 Three-trader Cases
We consider the case where there are 3 traders and everyone possesses
k
i
units of the good with k
1
+ k
2
+ k
3
= K and wants to hold at most
K units. We normalize K = 1, so each k
i
corresponds to i's share of
total units. We assume that traders' valuations are drawn from a uniform
distribution F on [0; 1]. We are looking for the prot-maximizing trading
mechanism.
10
See, e.g., Holmstrom and Myerson 1983. Here we focus just on the ex ante
ecient mechanism that places equal welfare weights on every trader and maximizes
the sum of all traders' expected gains from trade.
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Under the uniform distribution on [0; 1], we have (v) = 2v   1 and
(v) = 2v. Also, (y

i
) = (x

i
) implies y

i
= x

i
+
1
2
if x

i

1
2
, and let
y

i
= 1 if x

i
>
1
2
. Hence, for any v

i
2 [0; 1]
(v
i
jv

i
) =

2v
i
; v
i
< v

i
2v
i
  1; v
i
> v

i
and 8x

i
2 [0; 1]
(v
i
jx

i
) =
8
<
:
2v
i
; 8v
i
< x

i
2x

i
; 8x

i
 v
i
 y

i
2v
i
  1; 8v
i
> y

i
To solve the prot-maximizing mechanism, we need to determine
the vector x

according to the algorithm constructed in the proof of
Theorem 1. Without loss of generality, let k
1
 k
2
 k
3
, then we must
have x

1
 x

2
 x

3
. We rst consider the allocation rule ~q which always
breaks ties in favor of the participant with the highest index. We have
8
>
<
>
:
e
Q
1
(x

1
) = (x

1
)
2
  k
1
e
Q
2
(x

2
) = x

2
(x

2
+
1
2
)  k
2
e
Q
3
(x

3
) = (x

3
+
1
2
)
2
  k
3
So we are looking for the (unique) vector ~x = (~x
1
; ~x
2
; ~x
3
) which solves
8
>
>
<
>
>
:
e
Q
1
(~x
1
) = ~x
2
1
  k
1
= 0
e
Q
1
(min(~x
1
; ~x
2
)) +
e
Q
2
(~x
2
) = min(0; ~x
2
2
  k
1
) + ~x
2
(~x
2
+
1
2
)  k
2
= 0
e
Q
1
(min(~x
1
; ~x
2
; ~x
3
)) +
e
Q
2
(min(~x
2
; ~x
3
)) +
e
Q
3
(~x
3
) =
min(0; ~x
2
2
  k
1
; ~x
2
3
  k
1
) + min(0; ~x
3
(~x
3
+
1
2
)  k
2
) + (~x
3
+
1
2
)
2
  k
3
= 0
Next, we let x

1
= min(~x
1
; ~x
2
; ~x
3
), x

2
= min(~x
2
; ~x
3
) and x

3
= ~x
3
,
Depending on the respective values on k
1
, k
2
and k
3
, there are four
dierent possibilities: (i) x

1
< x

2
< x

3
, (ii) x

1
= x

2
< x

3
, (iii) x

1
<
x

2
= x

3
, and (iv) x

1
= x

2
= x

3
. Figure 1 illustrates the dierent set of
values for k
1
, k
2
and k
3
for which these dierent cases occur.
In area (i), which is determined by k
2
> k
1
+
1
2
p
k
1
and k
3
>

1
4
+
q
1
16
+ k
2

2
, we have
x

1
=
p
k
1
< x

2
=
r
1
16
+ k
2
 
1
4
< x

3
=
p
k
3
 
1
2
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In area (ii), which is determined by k
1
 k
2
 k
1
+
1
2
p
k
1
and k
3
>

3
8
+
q
1
64
+
k
1
+k
2
2

2
, we have
x

1
= x

2
=
r
1
64
+
k
1
+ k
2
2
 
1
8
< x

3
=
p
k
3
 
1
2
In area (iii), which is determined by k
1

3 
p
5
8
and k
1
+
1
2
p
k
1
<
k
2
 k
3


1
4
+
q
1
16
+ k
2

2
, we have
x

1
=
p
k
1
< x

2
= x

3
=
r
1
64
+
k
2
+ k
3
2
 
3
8
<
1
2
In area (iv), which corresponds to all cases other than (i), (ii) and
(iii), we have
x

1
= x

2
= x

3
=
p
5  1
4
(
1
4
< x

i
<
1
2
)
In cases (ii), (iii) and (iv), there will be a positive probability of ties.
In case (iii), for instance, there is a
1
4
probability that both 2 and 3
declare valuations between x

2
and y

2
= x

2
+
1
2
. In case of a tie between
2 and 3, let p denote the probability that the tie is broken in favor of 2.
If p = 0, then Q
2
(x

2
) =
e
Q
2
(x

2
)  0 
e
Q
3
(x

3
) = Q
3
(x

3
); if p = 1, we
have Q
3
(x

1
) =
e
Q
2
(x

2
) + k
2
  k
3
 0 
e
Q
3
(x

3
) + k
3
  k
2
= Q
2
(x

2
). So
there exists a value for p such that Q
2
(x

2
) = Q

3
(x

3
) = 0. In particular,
let k
1
= 0, k
2
=
1
3
and k
3
=
2
3
. In this case, we have x

1
= 0 and
x

2
= x

3
=
p
33 1
8
. (Note that the worst-o types of participants 2 and
3 are the same although k
3
= 2k
2
.) It is easy to nd that p =
7 
p
33
12
.
We see that the randomization rule is used here as an instrument in the
design of an optimal allocation. Following a similar argument, we can
nd a randomization in case of a tie in cases (ii) and (iv).
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. If the trading mechanism fq; tg is incentive com-
patible, i.e., for any two valuations v
i
; v

i
2 [v; v],
U
i
(v
i
) = v
i
Q
i
(v
i
)  T
i
(v
i
)  v
i
Q
i
(v

i
)  T
i
(v

i
)
and
U
i
(v

i
) = v

i
Q
i
(v

i
)  T
i
(v

i
)  v

i
Q
i
(v
i
)  T
i
(v
i
)
These two inequalities imply that
(v
i
  v

i
)Q
i
(v
i
)  U
i
(v
i
)  U
i
(v

i
)  (v
i
  v

i
)Q
i
(v

i
)
Thus, if v
i
> v

i
, we must have Q
i
(v
i
)  Q
i
(v

i
), so Q
i
(v
i
) is non-
decreasing. Furthermore, the above inequalities also imply that U
i
(v
i
) is
absolutely continuous, thus dierentiable almost everywhere with deriva-
tive
dU
i
dv
i
(v
i
) = Q
i
(v
i
); or in the more convenient integral form
U
i
(v
i
) = U
i
(v

i
) +
Z
v
i
v

i
Q
i
(u) du (16)
Also, if v

i
2 V

i
(q
i
), by denition of V

i
(q
i
), we have U
i
(v
i
)   U
i
(v

i
) =
R
v
i
v

i
Q
i
(u) du  0; that is, the expected net utility U
i
(v
i
) is minimized at
v

i
, hence fq; tg is individually rational if and only if U
i
(v

i
)  0.
Suppose now that Q
i
(v
i
) is non-decreasing and U
i
(v
i
) satises (16)
for some v

i
2 V

i
(q
i
), then for any v
i
and v^
i
,
U
i
(v
i
)  U
i
(v^
i
) =
Z
v
i
v^
i
Q
i
(u) du
 (v
i
  v^
i
)Q
i
(v^
i
)
where the inequality follows from the fact that Q
i
(u) is non-decreasing
in u. This inequality can be rewritten as
U
i
(v
i
)  U
i
(v^
i
) + (v
i
  v^
i
)Q
i
(v^
i
) = v
i
Q
i
(v^
i
)  T
i
(v^
i
)
Thus, fq; tg is incentive compatible. In the above, we have already shown
that when U
i
(v

i
)  0, an incentive compatible mechanism is also indi-
vidually rational. 2
Proof of Lemma 2. From Lemma 1, if fq; tg is a feasible trading
mechanism, the expected revenue of the mechanism equals
R = E
"
n
X
i=1
t
i
(v)
#
17
= E
"
n
X
i=1
(v
i
Q
i
(v
i
)  U
i
(v
i
))
#
= E
"
n
X
i=1
(v
i
Q
i
(v
i
) 
Z
v
i
v

i
Q
i
(u) du)
#
 
n
X
i=1
U
i
(v

i
)
Integrating the second term on the right by parts, we obtain
R =
n
X
i=1
E[(v
i
jv

i
)Q
i
(v
i
)] 
n
X
i=1
U
i
(v

i
)
For any function q(v) such that q
i
(v
i
; v
 i
) is non-decreasing in v
i
,
from the above and individual rationality constraints, the maximum ex-
pected revenue from any feasible mechanisms implementing q(v) cannot
be greater than
R(q) =
n
X
i=1
E[(v
i
jv

i
)Q
i
(v
i
)]
To complete the proof, we must construct a payment function t(v) so
that fq; tg is a feasible trading mechanism leading R(q). There are many
such functions which could be used; we will consider a function dened
as follows:
t
i
(v) = E
 i
"
v
i
q
i
(v
i
; v
 i
) 
Z
v
i
v

i
q
i
(u; v
 i
) du
#
  k
i
v

i
Note that the payment by trader i depends only on his own valuation
v
i
. From Lemma 1, the mechanism fq; tg is incentive compatible and
individually rational, and the expected revenue from this mechanism
equals R(q). Thus, our proof of Lemma 2 is complete. 2
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